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Abstract. The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices
for measuring the power a player has in a voting game. However, the problem
of computing these indices is computationally hard. To overcome this problem,
we analyze approximation methods for computing these indices. Although these
methods have polynomial time complexity, ﬁnding an approximate Shapley value
using them is easier than ﬁnding an approximate Banzhaf index. We also ﬁnd the
absolute error for the methods and show that this error for the Shapley value is
lower than that for the Banzhaf index.
1 Introduction
Coalition formation is a key form of interaction in multi-agent systems. It is the process
of joining together two or more agents so as to achieve goals that individuals on their
own cannot, or to achieve them more efﬁciently [10]. Often, in such situations, there
is more than one possible coalition, and the agents/ players must decide how to form
a coalition and how to split the gains of cooperation between the members of a coali-
tion. In this context, cooperative game theory offers a number of solution concepts such
as core, kernel, and stable solution [10]. A number of multiagent systems researchers
have used and extended these solutions to facilitate automated coalition formation [16,
17,14,13]. A key problem, in the context of multi-agent systems, is to study the compu-
tational aspects of the solutions that game theory provides. For example, [4] shows that
the problem of ﬁnding the core is NP-complete. Another problem with these solutions
is that, often there is more than one possible solution.
In order to overcome the problem of multiple solutions, Shapley proposed a solution
called the Shapley value [15]. The Shapley value not only provides a unique solution
to coalitional games but also provides a measure of how much inﬂuence or power a
player has in determining the outcome of a game. The higher a player’s Shapley value,
the more control he has in determining the outcome of a game. Thus the Shapley valuecan be viewed as an index for measuring the power of players in a game. Like Shapley
value, the Banzhaf index [2] is another way of measuring a player’s power. However,
a key drawback of both these power indices is that computing them for voting games1
is, in general, #P-complete [5,12]. In other words, it is practically infeasible to try
to compute the exact Shapley value or Banzhaf index. Hence, in order to overcome
this computational complexity we present a new randomized method for ﬁnding an
approximation for these indices.
The time complexity of the proposed approximation methods is polynomial in the
number of players. Now, the quality of an approximation is evaluated in terms of its
error of approximation. To this end, we ﬁnd the absolute error for the proposed methods
and show that this error for the Shapley value is lower than that for the Banzhaf index.
Although some approximation methods for the Shapley value have been proposed
in the past, to our knowledge, there has been no study of their performance in terms of
the approximation errors (see Section 5 for details). This paper not only provides new
approximation methods, but also analyzes them in terms of their errors.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the background
to voting games and power indices. In Section 3 we present our approximation meth-
ods. In Section 4 we analyze their absolute error. Section 5 discusses related literature.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
A coalitional game hN;vi, consists of:
1. a ﬁnite set, N = f1;2;:::;ng of players, and
2. a function, v, that associates with every non-empty subset S of N (i.e., a coalition)
a real number v(S) the worth of S that corresponds to it.
For each coalition S, v(S) is the total payoff that is available for division among the
members of S.
2.1 Weighted voting game
A weighted voting game G = hN;vi is a game such that [10]:
v(S) =

1 if w(S)  q
0 otherwise
for some q 2 R+ and wi 2 R+, where:
w(S) =
X
i2S
wi
for any coalition S. Thus wi is the number of votes that player i has and q is the
number of votes needed to win the game (i.e., the quota). This game is denoted as
hq;w1;:::;wni.
1 Voting games are an important mechanism for agents to reach consensus.2.2 Weighted k-majority game
For the set of n players, a weighted k-majority game (v1 ^ ::: ^ vk) is a game where
vt = [qt;wt
1;:::;wt
n], 1  t  k are weighted voting games and
(v1 ^ ::: ^ vk)(S) =

1 if wt(S)  qt for 1  t  k
0 otherwise
where wt(S) =
P
i2S wt
i.
2.3 Power indices
A power index for a voting game is a way of measuring a player’s voting power. A
player’s power is his ability to turn a losing coalition into a winning one. The Shapley
value and Banzhaf index are examples of power indices. The Banzhaf index, in turn,
has two versions: the absolute Banzhaf index and the normalised Banzhaf index. For a
voting game G = hN;vi, these indices are deﬁned as follows [15,2].
The marginal contribution of player i to coalition S with i = 2 S is a function iv
that is deﬁned as follows:
iv(S) = v(S [ fig)   v(S) (1)
This means a player’s marginal contribution to a coalition S is the increase in the value
of S as a result of i joining it. A player that makes a higher marginal contribution, on
average, has a higher Shapley value. Speciﬁcally, a player’s Shapley value is deﬁned in
terms of its marginal contribution as follows [15]:
Deﬁnition 1. The Shapley value ('i) of the game hN;vi for player i is the average of
its marginal contribution to all possible coalitions:
i =
X
SN
jSj!(n   jSj   1)!
n!
 iv(S) (2)
Note that for a voting game (hq;w1;:::;wni), a player’s marginal contribution is either
zero or one. This is because the value of any coalition is either zero or one. A coalition
with value zero is called a “losing coalition” and with value one a “winning coalition”.
If a player’s entry to a coalition changes it from losing to winning, then the player’s
marginal contribution for that coalition is one; otherwise it is zero. A coalition S is said
to be a swing for player i if S is losing but S [ fig is winning.
For player i 2 N, let i denote the number of swings, i.e.,:
i =
X
Ti
1 (3)
where Ti is a losing coalition but Ti [ fig is winning. The two versions of Banzhaf
index are deﬁned by expressing i over different denominators.
Deﬁnition 2. For player i, the absolute Banzhaf index (i) is deﬁned as [2]:
i = i=2n 1 (4)Deﬁnition 3. For player i, the normalized Banzhaf index (i) is deﬁned as [2]:
i = i=n
i=1i (5)
Note that the normalized Banzhaf index sums to unity over the players:
P
i = 1.
The problem of computing the Shapley value or the Banzhaf index for voting games
is #P-complete [5,12]. In order to overcome this problem, we present new approxima-
tion methods to ﬁnd these indices.
3 Approximate Power Indices
The methods we propose are an extension of the one presented in [7]. In more detail, [7]
is an approximation for the Shapley value for weighted voting games. Here we extend
this to ﬁnd approximates for the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index for both wieghted
voting games and k-majority games. Section 3.1 deals with methods for weighted vot-
ing games and Section 3.2 with those for k-majority games.
3.1 Weighted Voting Game
The intuition behind the method proposed in [7] is as follows. As per Deﬁnition 1, in or-
der to ﬁnd a player’s Shapley value, we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd his marginal contribution to all
possible coalitions. For n players, there are 2n 1 possible coalitions. Finding a player’s
marginal contribution to each of these 2n 1 possible coalitions is computationally in-
feasible. So instead of ﬁnding the marginal contribution to each possible coalition, this
method ﬁnds a player’s expected marginal contribution to random coalitions of size X
where 1  X  n. This is done by using the approximation rule R1 which is deﬁned
as follows.
Let the players’ weights in N be deﬁned by any probability distribution function.
Irrespective of the actual form of this function, let  be the mean weight for the set of
players and  be the variance in the players’ weights. From this set (N) if we randomly
draw a sample, then the approximate sum of the players’ weights in the sample is given
by the following rule [8]:
R1: If w1;w2;:::;wX is a random sample of size X drawn from any distri-
bution with mean  and variance , then the sample sum has an approximate
Normal distribution, N, with mean X and variance 
X (the larger the n the
better the approximation2).
We know, from Deﬁnition 1, that the Shapley value for a player is the expectation (E)
of its marginal contribution to a coalition that is chosen randomly. The above rule is
used to determine the Shapley value as follows.
For player i with weight wi, let  'i denote the approximate Shapley value. Also,
let X denote the size of a random sample drawn from N. The marginal contribution
of player i to this random sample is one if the total weight of the X players in the
2 Also, for large X, any measurement done on a sample drawn with replacement is the same as
that for a sample drawn without replacement [8]. 
 
 
              
 
                          
     
Fig.1. A normal distribution for the sum of players’ weights in a coalition of size X.
sample is greater than or equal to a = q   wi but less than b = q    (where  is an
iniﬁnitesimally small quantity). Otherwise, its marginal contribution is zero. Thus, the
expected (approximate) marginal contribution of player i (denoted EX
i ) to the sample
coalition is the area under the curve deﬁned by N(X; 
X) in the interval [a;b]. This
area is shown as the region B in Figure 1 (the dotted line in the ﬁgure is X). Hence
i’s approximate marginal contribution to X is:
EX
i =
1
p
(2=X)
Z b
a
e X
(x X)2
2 dx: (6)
And, as per Deﬁnition 1, i’s approximate Shapley value (denoted  'i) is the average of
his expected marginal contribution to all possible coalitions:
 'i =
1
n
n X
X=1
EX
i (7)
The time complexity of this method is O(n) [7].
We now extend this method to ﬁnd the Banzhaf index. For a game of n players,
let T denote the number of possible coalitions of X players, i.e., T = C(n;X) is the
number of combinations of X items drawn from a set of n items. Given this, player i’s
total approximate marginal contribution to all coalitions of size X is C(n;X)  EX
i
where EX
i is as computed in Equation 6. In other words, i’s approximate number of
swings for coalitions of size X is:
 X
i = C(n;X)  EX
i (8)
Hence, i’s approximate number of swings to coalitions of all possible sizes (1  X 
n) is:
 i =
n X
X=1
 X
i (9)
As per Equation 4, i’s approximate absolute Banzhaf index ( i) is:
 i =  i=2n 1 (10)And as per Equation 5, i’s approximate normalised Banzhaf index ( i) is:
 i =  i= (11)
where  =
Pn
i=1  i.
Algorithm 1 BanzhafIndexWVG(n, q, , , w)
N: Set of players
q: Quota for the game
: A k element vector containing the mean weight of the players in N for the k weighted voting
games
: A k element vector containing the variance in the weights of the players in N for the k
weighted voting games
w: A vector of the player’s weights
1: T ( 0
2: for i = 1 to n do
3:  i ( 0
4: for X = 1 to n do
5: a ( q   wi; b ( q   
6: E
X
i (
1 p
2=X
R b
a e
 X
(x X)2
2 dx
7:  
X
i ( E
X
i  C(n;X)
8:  i (  i +  
X
i
9: end for
10: T ( T +  i
11: end for
12: for i=1 to n do
13:  i ( i=2
n 1
14:  i ( i=T
15: end for
16: return   and  
The above steps are described in Algorithm 1. In more detail, Step 1 does the ini-
tialization. In Step 2, we vary X between 1 and n and repeatedly do the following. Step
3 is another initialization. In Step 4, we repeatedly do the followig. We ﬁnd player i’s
approximate marginal contribution to the random coalition of size X. In Step 7, we use
Equation 6 to ﬁnd the approximate number of player i’s swings for coalitions of size
X. In Step 8, we do the same for coalitions of all possible sizes. In Step 10, we ﬁnd the
approximate sum of the swings for all the n players. Finally, in Step 13 (14), we ﬁnd i’s
approximate absolute (normalized) Banzhaf index.
Theorem 1. The time to compute  i is O(n2), and that for  i is O(n3).
Proof. Since the time to compute X! is O(X) and the time to compute EX
i (as per
Equation 6) is O(1), the time to compute  X
i is O(n) (see Equation 8). From Equa-
tion 9 we get the time to compute  i as O(n2), and from Equation 10 we get the timeto compute  i as O(n2). Note that EX
i depends on the weight of player i, so it is dif-
ferent for different players. However, C(n;X) and X! are the same for all the players.
Thus, we need to ﬁnd C(n;X) and X! just once and reuse these values to compute the
Banzhaf index for all the players. So once we ﬁnd  i for a player i, the time to ﬁnd  X
j
for j 6= i is O(1). So the time to ﬁnd  j is O(n). Given this, the time to ﬁnd  j for all
players such that i 6= j is O(n2). It follows that  =
P
 i can be found in time O(n3)
and so can  i.
3.2 k-Majority Voting Game
We now extend the method described in [7] to k-majority games. The intuition behind
the proposed method is as follows. As described in Section 2.2, a k-majority game is
deﬁned in terms of k weighted voting games vj (1  j  k). Given this deﬁnition,
we ﬁrst ﬁnd a player’s approximate marginal contribution to vj (1  j  k) using
the method in [7]. Then on the basis of these k marginal contributions, we ﬁnd an
approximate marginal contribution for a k-majority game as follows.
For a random coalition SX of size X, the approximate marginal contribution of
player i to the game v1 ^ ::: ^ vk is 1 if the following conditions hold:
1. there is at least one game vj (1  j  k) for which i is the swing player, and
2. for each game vj, the value of SX [ fig is 1.
We ﬁrst introduce some notation to formalise the above conditions and then ﬁnd an
approximate Shapley value. Let SX be a random sample (of size X) drawn from N.
For game vt and player i, let PLt
i(SX) (where SX  N   fig) denote the probability
that the coalition SX is losing but SX [ fig is winning (i.e., for game vt, the proba-
bility that the expected marginal contribution of i to SX is 1). Also, for game vt, let
PWt(SX) denote the probability that the coalition SX is winning (i.e., the probability
that marginal contribution of i to SX is 0). Finally, for game vt, let t denote the mean
weight of the players, t the variance in their weights, and qt the quota. Then, for a
k-majority game, i’s expected marginal contribution to SX is:
kEX
i =
k X
j=1
 j Y
f=1
PL
f
i (SX) 
k Y
g=j+1
PWg(SX)

(12)
where PLt
i(SX) is the area under the normal distribution N(t;t) between the limits
qt   wt
i and qt   :
PLt
i(SX) =
1
p
(2t=X)
Z q
t 
qt wt
i
e
 X
(x Xt)2
2t dx (13)
and PWt(SX) is the area under the normal distribution N(t;t) between the limits
qt and 1:
PWt(SX) =
1
p
(2t=X)
Z q
t w
w
i  1
0
e
 X
(x Xt)2
2t dx +
Z 1
qt
e
 X
(x Xt)2
2t dx

: (14)Given PLt
i(SX) and PWt(SX), the approximate Shapley value (as per Deﬁnition 1)
for player i for a k-majority game is:
 'k
i =
1
n
n X
X=1
kEX
i (15)
The above steps are described in Algorithm 2. We now present the time complexity of
this method.
Theorem 2. The time complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(k2n).
Proof. The time to execute the for loop in Step 4 of Algorithm 2 is O(k2). Since this for
loop is within the for loop of Step 2 (which is executed n times), the time complexity of
Algorithm 2 is O(k2n).
Algorithm 2 ShapleyValue-KMG(k, n, q, , , w)
k: The number of weighted voting games
n: Number of players
q: Quota for the game
: A k element vector containing the mean weight of the players in N for the k weighted voting
games
: A k element vector containing the variance in the weights of the players in N for the k
weighted voting games
w: The player’s weights for the k weighted voting games
1: Ti ( 0;
2: for X = 1 to n do
3: sum ( 0
4: for j = 1 to k do
5: prod ( 1
6: for f = 1 to j do
7: a ( q
f   w
f
i ; b ( q
f   
8: prod ( prod 
1 p
2f=X
R b
a e
 X
(x Xf )2
2f dx
9: end for
10: for g = j + 1 to k do
11: a ( q
g; b1 ( q
g   w
g
i   1; b2 ( 1
12: prod ( prod 
1 p
2g=X(
R b1
0 e
 X
(x Xg)2
2g dx +
R b2
a e
 X
(x Xg)2
2g dx)
13: end for
14: sum ( sum + prod
15: end for
16: kE
X
i ( sum
17: Ti ( Ti + E
X
i
18: end for
19:  '
k
i ( Ti=n
20: return  '
k
iWe now extend the method described in Algorithm 1 (for Banzhaf index) to k-majority
games. For player i’, let k X
i denote the approximate number of swings for coalitions
of size X. Then from Equation 8, we have the following:
k X
i = C(n;X)  kEX
i (16)
where kEX
i is as computed in Equation 12. Substituting Equation 12 in Equation 16
we get k X
i . For player i, let k i be the approximate number of swings for coalitions
of all possible sizes. Also, for player i, let  k
i and  k
i denote the approximate absolute
and normalised Banzhaf indices respectively. Then, player i’s approximate number of
swings over coalitions of all possible sizes is:
k i =
n X
X=1
k X
i (17)
As per Equation 4, i’s approximate absolute Banzhaf index ( k
i ) is:
 k
i = k i=2n 1 (18)
And as per Equation 5, i’s approximate normalised Banzhaf index ( k
i ) is:
 k
i = k i=k (19)
where k =
Pn
i=1 k i.
The above steps are detailed in Algorithm 3.
Theorem 3. The time to compute  k
i is O(k2n2) and that for  k
i is O(n3k2).
Proof. As per Equation 12, the time to ﬁnd kEX
i is O(k2). Also, as per Equation 16,
the time to ﬁnd k X
i is O(nk2). From Equation 17, we get the time to ﬁnd k i as
O(n2k2). From Equation 18, we know that the time ﬁnd  k
i the same as the time to ﬁnd
k i. Given this, the time to compute k is n times the time to compute k i. Hence, from
Equation 19, we get the time to compute  k
i as O(n3k2).
Now, the quality of an approximation method is evaluated on the basis of its running
time and also its approximation error. To this end, the following section conducts error
analysis for the proposed methods.Algorithm 3 BanzhafIndex-KMG(k, n, q, , , w)
k: The number of weighted voting games
n: Number of players
q: Quota for the game
: A k element vector containing the mean weight of the players in N for the k weighted voting
games
: A k element vector containing the variance in the weights of the players in N for the k
weighted voting games
w: An array of player’s weights for the k weighted voting games
1: Ti ( 0;
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: for X = 1 to n do
4: sum ( 0
5: for j = 1 to k do
6: prod ( 1
7: for f = 1 to j do
8: a ( q
f   w
f
i ; b ( q
f   
9: prod ( prod 
1 p
2f=X
R b
a e
 X
(x Xf )2
2f dx
10: end for
11: for g = j + 1 to k do
12: a ( q
g; b1 ( q
g   w
g
i   1; b2 ( 1
13: prod ( prod 
1 p
2g=X

R b1
0 e
 X
(x Xg)2
2g dx +
R b2
a e
 X
(x Xg)2
2g dx

14: end for
15: sum ( sum + prod
16: end for
17: kE
X
i ( sum
18: k 
X
i ( kE
X
i  C(n;X)
19: k i ( k i + k 
X
i
20: end for
21: T ( T + k i
22: end for
23: for i=1 to n do
24:  
k
i ( i=2
n 1
25:  
k
i ( i=T
26: end for
27: return  
k and  
k
4 Error Analysis
We ﬁrst formalize the idea of error and then derive the formula for measuring the error
in the approximate power indices of Section 3. The concept of error relates to a mea-
surement made of a quantity which has an exact value [18,3]. Obviously, it cannot be
determined exactly how far off a measurement is from the exact value; if this could be
done, it would be possible to just give the more accurate, corrected value. Thus, errorhas to do with uncertainty in measurements that nothing can be done about. However,
although it is not possible to do anything about such an error, it can be characterized in
terms of two essential components [18,3]:
1. a numerical value giving the best “estimate” possible of the quantity measured, and
2. the degree of uncertainty associated with this estimated value.
For example, if the estimate of a quantity is x and the uncertainty is e(x) the quantity
would lie in x  e(x). For sampling based methods, uncertainty is characterized in
terms of standard error [18] which is analogous to the algorithmic term absolute error.
This error is equal to the absolute difference between the approximate and its exact
counterpart [1]. We ﬁrst ﬁnd this error for our approximate Shapley value and then
compare it with the error for our approximate Banzhaf index.
4.1 Absolute error
Standard error, which we use to measure the absolute error, is deﬁned as follows [18,
3]:
Deﬁnition 4. Standard error is deﬁned as the standard deviation for a set of measure-
ments divided by the square root of the number of measurements.
Given this deﬁnition, for a weighted voting game, let e(X) be the absolute error in
the approximate sum of weights for a random coalition of size X where:
e(X) =
p
(=X)=
p
(X)
=
p
()=X: (20)
Then let e(EX
i ) denote the error in the approximate marginal contribution for
player i (given in Equation 6). This error is obtained by propagating the error in Equa-
tion 20 to the error in a player’s expected marginal contribution given in Equation 6. In
Equation 6, a and b are the lower and upper limits for the sum of the players’ weights
for a coalition of size X. Since the error in this sum is e(X), the actual values of a and
b lie in the intervals a  e(X) and b  e(X) respectively. Hence, the error in Equa-
tion 6 is either the probability that the sum lies between the limits a e(X) and a (i.e.,
the area under the curve deﬁned by N(X; 
X) between a e(X) and a, which is the
shaded region A in Figure 1) or the probability that the sum of weights lies between the
limits b and b + e(X) (i.e., the area under the curve deﬁned by N(X; 
X) between b
and b + e(X), which is the shaded region C in Figure 1). More speciﬁcally, the error
is at most the maximum of these two probabilities:
e(EX
i ) =
1
p
(2=X)
 MAX
Z a
a e(X)
e X
(x X)2
2 dx;
Z b+e(
X)
b
e X
(x X)2
2 dx

(21)
On the basis of the above error, we ﬁnd the error in the Shapley value by using the
following standard error propagation rules. Let x and y be two random variables witherrors e(x) and e(y) respectively. Then, from [18] we have the following propagation
rules:
R1 The error in the random variable z = x + y is:
e(z) = e(x) + e(y)
R2 If z = kx where the constant k has no error, then the error in z is:
e(z) = jkje(x)
R3 The error in the random variable z = x  y is:
e(z) = e(x) + e(y)
4.2 Absolute error for weighted voting games
Using the above rules, the error in the Shapley value (given in Equation 7) is obtained
by propagating the error in Equation 21 to all coalitions between the sizes X = 1 and
X = n. This error (denoted e(  'i)) is:
e( 'i) =
1
n
n X
X=1
e(EX
i ) (22)
Note that we are ﬁnding the absolute error for the Shapley value. Here, it is interesting
to note that a related concept for characterising the quality of approximation is per-
formance ratio. Roughly speaking, this is the ratio of an approximate solution and its
exact counterpart [1]. The problem of approximating the Shapley value such that the
approximation ratio is bounded by a constant is intractable unless P=NP [6]. In future,
it would be interesting to obtain a similar result for the absolute error as well.
We now turn to the error in the approximate Banzhaf index. Using the error propa-
gation rules (R1, R2, and R3), we get the error in the  X
i (see Equation 8) as:
e( X
i ) = e(EX
i )  C(n;X): (23)
Given Equation 23, the error in  i (see Equation 9) is:
e( i) =
n X
X=1
e( X
i ) (24)
From Equations 24 and 10, we get the error in  i as:
e( i) = e( i)=2n 1 (25)
And, as per Equaton 11, the error in  i is:
e( i) = e( i) +
n X
i=1
e( i) (26)
The above equations lead to the following observation for our methods:
Observation. For a given weighted voting game, we have the following relationship:
the approximation error in a player’s normalized Banzhaf index is higher than the error
in its absolute Banzhaf index and the error in its Shapley value
 
e( i) > e( 'i) and
e( i) > e( i)

.4.3 Error for k-majority games
On the basis of the results of Section 4.2, we now analyze the error for k-majority
games. Before doing so, we introduce some notation. Let e(X
t ) be the error in the
approximate sum of weights of SX for game t. Let e(PLt
i(SX)) and e(PWt(SX)) de-
note the errors in PLt
i(SX) and PWt(SX) respectively. These two errors are obtained
in the same way as we obtained e(EX
i ) in Equation 21. Hence we have:
e(PLt
i(SX)) =
1
p
(2t=X)
 MAX
Z q
t +e(
X
t )
qt 
e
 X
(x Xt)2
2t dx;
Z q
t w
t
i
qt wt
i e(X
t )
e
 X
(x Xt)2
2t dx

(27)
and
e(PWt(SX)) =
1
p
(2t=X)

Z q
t w
t
i 1 e(
X
t )
qt wt 1
e
 X
(x Xt)2
2t dx +
Z q
t
qt e(X
t )
e
 X
(x Xt)2
2t dx

: (28)
For k-majority games, let e(kEX
i ) denote the error in i’s marginal contribution to a
random coalition of size X, and let e( 'k
i ) denote the error in i’s Shapley value. From
rule R3, we get:
e(kEX
i ) =
k X
j=1
 j X
f=1
e(PL
f
i (SX)) +
k X
g=j+1
e(PWg(SX))

(29)
So the error in i’s Shapley value is:
e( 'k
i ) =
1
n
n X
X=1
e(kEX
i ) (30)
We now analyze the error in Banzhaf index. Combining Equation 29 with Equation 16,
we get the error in k X
i as:
e(k X
i ) = e(kEX
i )  C(n;X) (31)
The error in k i (see Equation 17) is:
e(k i) =
n X
X=1
e(k X
i ) (32)
The error in  k
i (see Equation 18) is:
e( k
i ) = e(k i)=2n 1 (33)The error in  k
i (see Equation 19) is:
e( k
i ) = e(k i) +
n X
i=1
e(k i): (34)
From the above equations, we make the following observation regarding our methods.
Observation. For a given k-majority game, we have the following relationship: the
approximation error in a player’s normalized Banzhaf index is higher than the error
in its absolute Banzhaf index and the error in its Shapley value
 
e( k
i ) > e( 'k
i ) and
e( k
i ) > e( k
i )

.
5 Related work
A number of approximation methods have been proposed for ﬁnding an approximate
Shapley value. These include [9,11,19]. The method proposed in [9] is based on com-
puting an approximate Shapley value by making measurements on random samples of
coalitions. However the method does not specify how the samples need to be drawn. It
is important to know how to draw samples because this is a key factor that determines
the quality of approximation. In contrast, our method is based on the approximation rule
deﬁned in Section 3.1 and does not require making measurements on random samples.
The method proposed in [11] uses a different randomization method from ours but like
our method, it too does not require drawing random samples. Finally, [19] presented a
randomization method for an approximate Shapley value in the context of task oriented
domains. Also, like our method, [11,19] have linear time complexity. Hence, in future,
we need to compare the approximation error for these two methods with that for ours.
6 Conclusions and future work
The Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring a the
power a player has in a voting game. However, the problem of computing these indices
is computationally hard. To overcome this problem, we presented new approximation
methods for computing these indices. Although the proposed methods have polynomial
time complexity, ﬁnding an approximate Shapley value using them is easier than ﬁnding
an approximate Banzhaf index. We also found the absolute error for our methods and
showed that this error for the Shapley value is lower than that for the Banzhaf index. In
future, we need to ﬁnd the bounds on these errors.
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